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1. Introduction
The process by which potential plaintiffs decide whether to pursue a claim by filing
a lawsuit has important implications for case outcomes including the trial rate and the
success rate at trial. In an earlier paper (Eisenberg and Farber), we develop and test a
theory of case selection that predicts different trial rates and trial win rates for corporations
and individuals based on hypothesized differences in the variance of their litigation costs.
In this study, we provide a further test of the case selection model by extending our analysis
to cases involving the United States as litigant, both as plaintiff and defendant.
Understanding federal government litigation is important in its own right because it
comprises a substantial portion of the federal courts' business. Cases in which the United
States' presence as a party formed a basis for federal jurisdiction accounted for 30.4 percent
of the 4,290,117 federal civil nonbankruptcy cases terminated from fiscal 1979 to 1997 and
for 16.5 percent of the 159,799 cases that terminated by judgment after trial. To the extent
that government has distinctive characteristics as a litigant, comparison of its litigation
patterns with those of private litigants provides an important empirical test of the case
selection model.
In the next section, we describe the substantive areas where the legal standards govern-
ing cases with the United States and with private parties are similar: personal injury torts
and job discrimination. Cases in these areas will form the basis of our empirical analysis.
In section 3, we develop a model of the plaintiff's decision to file a lawsuit (a case
selection model) with implications for trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial. The model
The data used in this Article (Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970-1997) were originally
collected by the Federal Judicial Center. The data were made available by the Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research. Neither the Center nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the
analyses presented here. We would like to thank for its computer and data support the Cornell Institute
for Social and Economic Research. Much of the work on this article was completed while Professor Farber
was a John M. Olin Fellow at Cornell Law School. An earlier version of this paper was presented atthe
1996 annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association.
1implies that trial rates will be inversely related to defendant costs and to the probability
of defendant liability. The model also implies that the probability of a plaintiff win at
trial is directly related to plaintiffs costs and to the probability of defendant liability and
inversely related to defendants costs and the stakes of the case.
In sections 4 and 5, we discuss likely differences between the government and private
parties as litigants in tort and job discrimination cases. While the basic legal standards
governing tort and job discrimination cases are similar between the government and private
parties, in sections 4 through 6 we note four differences: 1) the government has lower costs
than do private parties as defendants in both tort and job discrimination cases, 2) the
stakes are lower in both tort and job discrimination cases with the government as defendant
relative to cases with private parties as defendant, 3) the government as plaintiff in job
discrimination cases generally brings cases of higher quality (higher probability of liability)
than do private plaintiffs, and 4) average litigation costs among private plaintiffs in job
discrimination cases are lower the average government's litigation costs in the same role
The selection model developed in section 3 has clear implications for how these dif-
ferences will affect case outcomes. We predict that the trial rate will be higher and the
plaintiff win rate will be higher in cases where the government is defendant relative to cases
with private defendants. We also predict that the trial rate will be lower and the plaintiff
win rate will be higher in job discrimination cases where the government is plaintiff relative
to job discrimination cases with private plaintiffs.
In section 6 we describe the data we use for the empirical analysis. These data, on
about 350,000 cases filed in federal district court between 1979 and 1997 in the areas
of personal injury and job discrimination, are derived from the Federal Integrated Court
Database.
The results of the empirical analysis are contained in section 7. We find support for all
of the predictions noted in the previous paragraph save one. The single anomalous result
is that the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with the government as defendant
is lower than the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with private defendants.
The results confirm the need to consider the pre-filing selection process in interpreting
post-filing patterns of case outcomes.
22. Subject Areas With Both Government and Private Litigants
Analyzing the government as litigant requires classes of cases that involve governments
and private parties in the same roles. In addition, to allow for meaningful comparison,
similar legal standards should govern private and government litigants and any differ-
ences in legal standards should have clear implications for the characteristics of cases filed.
In general, litigation involving the United States is not typical of the mass of litigation.
Cases initiated by the government include a massive number of highly successful, quickly
resolved, collection actions.1 Even non-collection contract litigation involving the govern-
ment may differ from private litigation. A contract case against the government may not
be fundamentally the same as a contract case against a private party. A whole subfield of
government contract law exists.
At least two subject areas contain both government and private litigants and share
governing legal standards: tort cases and job discrimination cases, and we restrict our
analysis to case outcomes in these areas. In the remainder of this section, we outline the
legal standards in these areas and note some clear differences between the laws governing
private and government litigants. We will rely on these differences to generate most of the
testable implications of the selection model for case outcomes.
Tort Cases
Federal court tort cases in which the federal government is the defendant are, under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), based on state law. The law of the state where the
tort occurs governs the action, and the federal government is expressly made liable when
a private party would be liable (28 U.S.C. secs. 1346(b), 2674). State substantive tort law
also governs federal court tort cases in which the diverse residence of private parties is the
basis for federal jurisdiction (Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 1938). Thus,
the substantive law governing federal court tort actions against the federal government is
substantially similar to the law governing federal court actions against private defendants.
For summary statistics about the large number of collection and enforcement actions in federal court,
see Clermont and Eisenberg (1995:Appendix).
3Differences in the law governing the two classes of tort actions do exist. Tort cases
with a private defendant are tried in federal court in cases where there is diversity of
residence. Diversity cases, unlike FTCA cases, are subject to a jurisdictional amount
limitation. Unless the plaintiff's complaint alleges that at least $50,000 is in controversy,
federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear diversity cases (28 U.S.C. sec. 1332(a)). This
amount was increased from $10,000 in 1988 (Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642). And
FTCA cases are subject to a requirement that plaintiffs first present their claims to the
appropriate federal agency.2 More substantively, the FTCA provides the United States
with a defense, the discretionary function exception, that is not generally available in
private tort litigation (28 U.S.C. sec. 2680(a)). And neither punitive damages nor jury
trials are available against the United States under the FTCA (28 U.S.C. secs. 2402, 2674).
We consider below the effect of these differences on expected case outcomes.
Job Discrimination Cases
Our second group of cases is job discrimination cases. The bulk of employment discrim-
ination suits are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and are brought
in federal court.3 Most of these cases involve private plaintiffs suing private defendants.
In Title VII cases, however, the United States can be present on either side of the law suit.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may bring Title VII actions on behalf
of private litigants (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(f)(1)) and the Attorney General may sue in
cases involving a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-6).
Departments, agencies, and units of the United States may be, and often are, defendants
in Title VII actions (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-16(c)).
2 28 U.S.C. sec. 2675(a) states in part:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury
or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting with in the scope of his office or employment, unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall
have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure
of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months afteritis filed shall, at the option
of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.
Passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 u.S.C. secs. 12101 et seq., may, over time, shift
the makeup of filed job discrimination cases.Since,as discussed below, we limit the sample to cases filed
in 1991 or earlier, ADA cases should have no effect on our analysis. The ADA wasenactedon July 26,
1990, and became effective two years later. Pub. L. 101-336, sec. 108, 104 Stat. 328.
4The substantive legal standards governing purely private Title VII litigation are the
same as the legal standards that apply when the United States appears as a defendant (42
U.S.C. sec. 2000e-16(c), (d)). Thus, Title VII cases allow one to compare the government's
behavior both as a plaintiff and as a defendant with the behavior of private parties.
Some differences between legal rules that apply to government and private litigants are
again worth noting. Plaintiffs suing either private or government defendants for discrimina-
tion must first present their claims administratively. But the agencies to which complaints
must be presented differ. Plaintiffs suing the United States must first present their claims
to the decision-making federal agency or unit (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-16(c)). Plaintiffs suing
private defendants must first present their claims to a state equal opportunity employment
commission or to the EEOC (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5).
A statute, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, under which one may sue private defendants for employ-
ment discrimination, is not available against the United States as an entity. During the
period covered by this study, in cases of intentional discrimination, section 1981 provided
a basis for blacks and other minorities, but not women, to seek compensatory and punitive
damages and jury trials. These remedies were not available in Title VII actions against
the United States (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a).4 Section 1981 also has different proce-
dural requirements than Title VII (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a:602 n.38). But available
evidence suggests that differences between case outcomes in Title VII and section 1981
actions are minimal (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a:600).5
Once again, we consider below the effect of these differences on expected case outcomes.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the availability of compensatory damages and jury trials to
women in intentional discrimination cases against both private and governmental defendants. 42 U.S.C.
sec. 1981a(a)(1), (2), (c). Punitive damages are still not allowed against the government. 42 U.S.C. sec.
1981a(b)(1). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was generally effective on Nov. 21, 1991, the date of Pub. L.
No. 102-166's enactment, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 402(a), and does not apply to cases arising before its
enactment. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257, 1994.
"Examining the outcome and procedural progress of section 1981 litigation reveals no distinctive
pattern differentiating it from litigation under section 1983 and title VII."). This is likely because of the
considerable overlap between section 1981 actions and title VII actions (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a:602-
03).
53. Theoretical Framework
In our earlier work we developed a theoretical framework to examine the effect on suit
outcomes of the selection of potential claims for litigation (Eisenberg and Farber). We
extend that selection model here to consider its implications for the case outcomes given
differences between the government and private parties as litigants. In this section, we
develop a specific version of this model of the litigation process that includes specifications
for the expected trial outcome, the negotiated settlement, and the probability of a trial.
We then use these constructs to model the plaintiff's decision regarding whether to file a
lawsuit.
The Basic Model of Case Selection
Consider a potential plaintiff's decision regarding whether or not to file a lawsuit.
Without being specific about the information structure or timing of the litigation process,
the suit has some expected value to the plaintiff, E(V), as a function of the likelihood
that the defendant would be found liable at trial (ir), the expected damages that would be
awarded at trial conditional on a finding of liability (D), and the costs to the plaintiff and
defendant (C and Cd respectively) of litigation. More formally, the plaintiff's expected
value of filing a suit is6
E(V) =V,(7r,D,C,Cd). (1)
The potential plaintiff will file a lawsuit if and only if E(V,) ￿ 0.
The plaintiff's expected value of filing a lawsuit is a probability-of-trial weighted average
of the expected outcome at trial and the negotiated outcome. This is
(2)
where P is the plaintiff's expectation about the probability of trial, Y is the plaintiff's
expectation of the trial outcome should a trial occur, and Y is the plaintiff's expectation
of the negotiated outcome should such an outcome occur. We assume for simplicity that
6 Depending on the information structure of thegame, ir, D,and/orCdmaynot be known to the
plaintiff, ex ante,and,if not known, will be represented by the parameters of some prior distribution.
6the plaintiff and defendant are risk neutral. Thus, the plaintiff's utility is Y from a trial
outcome and Y from a negotiated outcome. The defendant's utility is —Y from a trial
outcome and —Y from a negotiated outcome.
As a first step toward calculating the probability of trial, we derive the contract zone,
which is the range of potential negotiated settlements that both parties prefer to a trial
outcome. Suppose the parties have common expectations about the level of damages,
D, but potentially divergent expectations about the likelihood of liability at trial. Let
the plaintiff's and defendant's expected probability of liability be 7r and d respectively.




where r is the common component of the probability of liability and O, and 0d are the
plaintiff's and defendant's idiosyncratic components of the expected probability of liability.
The idiosyncratic components are assumed to have zero mean and to be uncorrelated with
other characteristics.
The plaintiff expects a net value from trial of 7rD —Ci,,and the plaintiff will accept no
less than this as a negotiated settlement. Analogously, the defendant expects a net value
from trial of —7rdD —Cd,and the defendant will pay no more than this as a negotiated
settlement. Thus, the contract zone is defined by
7rD—C<Y<1rdD+Cd, (5)
and the size of the contract zone is
CZ=(7rd-7r)D+(C+Cd)
=(8d—9)D+(Cp+Cd). (6)
Note that size of the contract zone does not depend on the common component of the prob-
ability of liability (7r), but it is directly related to the difference between the defendant's
and plaintiff's idiosyncratic components (Od —
7We assume that a necessary and sufficient condition for a negotiated settlement is that
the size of the contract zone is weakly positive. Trial outcomes occur only when CZ < 0,
and this happens oniy when expectations are relatively optimistic (ir > ir or O > Od).
If expectations are identical or relatively pessimistic (irir or 9 < 8d), then positive
aggregate costs are sufficient to guarantee CZ > 0 and a negotiated settlement.7 It is
clear from equation 6 that, for any degree of divergent expectations, higher total costs of
disagreement (C + Cd) make it more likely that there will be a positive contract zone.
This is a basis for the claim that higher costs of disagreement lead to more negotiated
settlements and fewer disputes (trials).
The property of the model that a trial occurs if CZ < 0 can be used to derive the
ex ante probability of trial from the plaintiff's perspective. The plaintiff knows it and
its idiosyncratic factor (9). We assume that the plaintiff does not know the defendant's
idiosyncratic value (Od) but knows that Od is drawn from a distribution with cumulative
distribution function F(.). The condition for a trial, CZ <0, can be written, on rearrange-
ment of equation 6, as
Od<Op_PD, (7)
so that the probability of a trial is
P=F(O_C).
(8)
This implies that trials are more likely where 0, and D are higher and where C1 and Cd
are lower.
The final quantity needed to compute E(V)isthe plaintiff's expectation of the nego-
tiated outcome should such an outcome occur. In order to compute this expectation, a
specific solution to the bargaining problem is required, and, as is commonly done in the
applied economics literature on bargaining, we rely on the Nash solution.8 Central to the
See Farber and Bazerman, 1987; Farber and Bazerman, 1989; and Farber and Katz, 1979 for discussions
of divergent expectations as an explanation for disagreement.
8 The solution to the Nash bargaining problem is the outcome that satisfies a set of four axioms (pareto
optimality, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and insensitivity to linear transformations
of utility). See Nash, 1950. The general character of results is likely to be supported by the solution to a
wide range of bargaining models.
8Nash solution are the threat points of the parties. These are the payoffs to the parties in
the event that they do not agree on a negotiated settlement, and they are expressed here
as the expected trial outcome net of costs. If the parties do not agree on a negotiated
settlement, the expected trial outcome is to award irD to the plaintiff. This expected
trial outcome yields a payoff to the plaintiff net of costs of irD C and yields a payoff
to the defendant net of costs of —irD— Cd.9These expected payoffs from a trial outcome
are the threat points of the Nash bargaining model.
In order to derive the Nash solution, first compute for each party the difference between
the payoff from the negotiated settlement and the payoff at trial net of costs. The payoffs
at trial net of costs are the threat point payoffs, and these differences are the net gains from
a negotiated settlement relative to receiving the threat point payoffs. The Nash solution
to the bargaining problem is derived as the value of Y that maximizes the product of the




—(—irD — Cd)). (9)




which is the negotiation payoff to the plaintiff. Note that Y is positively related to the
expected trial outcome ((7r + O)D and the defendant's costs (Cd) and negatively related to
the plaintiff's costs (Cr).
Note that this using this payoff to the defendant in forming the plaintiff's expectation regarding the
Nash solution to the bargaining problem implies that the potential plaintiff ignores any information there
might be in the fact that the parties cannot agree on a negotiated settlement (i.e., that CZ < 0) and
assumes that the defendant has the same probability of liability as the plaintiff (lrp). This was done to
keep the mathematical exposition relatively clear. At least two alternatives to this assumption are possible.
First, the plaintiff might realize in the event that no negotiated settlement is reached that expectations
are sufficiently relatively optimistic to cause CZ < 0. This would mean that ir < —CP±Cdand
would affect the plaintiff's expectation of the defendant's threat point. Second, the plaintiff might use the
unconditional expectation of irj based on F(.). Neither of these alternatives changes the basic character
of the theoretical results.
9Now consider the plaintiff's decision regarding whether to file a lawsuit in the case
where the negotiated settlement is as defined in equation 10. In fact, there may not be
a negotiated settlement, and the case may go to trial, yielding a net trial payoff to the
plaintiff as noted above of
Yt=7rD—C
=(r+O)D—C. (11)
This too is a positively related to the expected trial outcome and negatively related to the
plaintiff's costs, but it is unrelated to the defendant's costs.
Using the Nash solution in equation 10 as the negotiated settlement and using the net
trial payoff in equation 11, the plaintiff's expected value for the lawsuit is
+P[D—C],
=(+G)D+2 _Pc. (12)
Holding P fixed, it is straightforward to demonstrate, based on equation 12, that E(V)
is increasing in ir, 6, D, and Cd and decreasing in C. However, the case characteristics
(with the exception of ir) affect P as well, and this makes it more difficult to sign their
effects on E(Vp). Specifically,











SinceF-andare positive and -andOCd arenegative, only canbe signed
unambiguously (positive). The first-order effects of increases in r, O and D are, not
10surprisingly, positive as increasing the plaintiff's expected trial outcome increases the ex-
pected value of filing suit. But increasing the plaintiff's expected trial outcome (through
an increase in 8 or D) also increases the probability of trial, which has a negative effect
on the expected value of filing suit. Similarly, the first-order effect of an increase in the
plaintiff's costs is to decrease the expected value of filing suit, but the increase in plaintiff's
costs decreases the probability of trial which has a positive effect on the expected value
of filing suit. An increase in the defendant's costs has a positive first order effect on the
plaintiff's expected value of filing suit that is reinforced by the implied decrease in the
probability of trial.
We proceed using the reasonable assumption that the effects of the implied changes
in the probability of trial are not sufficiently large to offset the first-order effects. This
implies that the plaintiff's expected value from filing suit is increasing in it,O,D, and Cd
and decreasing in C. Thus, plaintiffs are more likely to file suit where it,D,and Cd
are higher and where C is lower.
Implications of the Model for Trial Rates
The data contain information for filed cases on whether or not the case was decided
through a trial and whether or not the plaintiff won at trial.'0 Equation 8 expresses the cx
ante probability of a trial from the plaintiff's perspective, P. However, from the analyst's
perspective, the cx post probability of a trial in cases where a lawsuit has been filed is
T =Pr[(ir
—lrd)D
—(C+ Cd) > 0E(V) > 0]
Pr[(O —04D
—(C+ Cd) > 0lE(V) > 0] (17)
where E(V) is defined in equation 12 as a function of it,Os,,D, C, and C.
Without considering the systematic selection of cases for litigation, the probability of
trial is unrelated to the common component of the probability of liability (it),positively
related to the stakes (D), and negatively related to each party's costs of litigation (C and
Cd). However, consideration of the selection process modifies these predictions.
10Moreprecisely, there is information on whether or not judgment was entered for the plaintiff after
trial. We discuss below potential problems in interpreting this information as indicating a plaintiff win.
11There is no direct effect of the common component of the probability of liability (ir)on
the probability of trial, but there is an indirect effect through the selection process. The
plaintiff's expected value of filing suit (E(V))ispositively related to ir. This implies that
an increase in ir will make it optimal to file suit in cases where the plaintiff's idiosyncratic
information about the probability of liability (O,)islower, where plaintiff's costs are higher,
where defendant's costs are lower, and where the stakes are lower. With the exception of
the decrease in defendant's costs all of these changes in the composition of cases filed imply
that the trial rate will be lower where the common component of the probability of liability
is higher.
The direct effect of the stakes (D)onthe trial rate is positive, but the indirect effect
through the case selection process offsets this to some extent. The plaintiff's expected
value of filing suit (E(V))ispositively related to D.Thisimplies that an increase in
Dwillmake it optimal to file suit in cases where the plaintiff's information about the
probability of liability (ir and O)arelower, where plaintiff's costs are higher, and where
defendant's costs are lower. With the exception of the decrease in defendant's costs all of
these selection-induced changes in the composition of cases filed imply that the trial rate
will be lower where the stakes are higher, weakening the direct effect.
The direct effect of plaintiff's costs (Cr)onthe trial rate is negative, but there is an
offsetting effect through the case selection process. E(V)isnegatively related to C.This
implies that an increase in Cr,,willmake it optimal to file suit in cases where the plaintiff's
information about the probability of liability (ir and O)ismore favorable, where the stakes
are higher, and where defendant's costs are higher. With the exception of the increase in
defendant's costs all of these selection-induced changes in the composition of cases filed
imply that the trial rate will be higher where the plaintiff's costs of litigation are higher,
weakening the direct effect.
The direct effect of defendant's costs (Cd)onthe trial rate is negative, and the effect
through the selection process reinforces the direct effect. E(V)ispositively related to Cd.
Thisimplies that an increase in Cdwillmake it optimal to file suit in cases where the
plaintiff's information about the probability of liability (ir and 0ri)isless favorable, where
the stakes are lower, and where plaintiff's costs are higher. All of these selection-induced
12changes in the composition of cases filed imply that the trial rate will be lower where the
defendant's costs of litigation are higher, reinforcing the direct effect.
The left panel of table 1 contains a summary of the predictions of the model with
regard to the relationships between the trial rate and case characteristics. The predictions
are unambiguously negative with regard to the effects of itandCd on the trial rate. But
there are not clear predictions with regard to the effects of D and C on trial rates because
the direct and selection effects are offsetting. However, if we assume that the direct effects
dominate, then the trial rate is positively related to D and negatively related to C.
Implications of the Model for Plaintiff Win Rates at Trial
The model has implications for how plaintiff win rates at trial vary with the parties'
litigation costs through the case selection process. We represent the probability that the
defendant is liable at trial as
(18)
where itisthe common component of the probability of liability and Ot is a random com-
ponent with zero mean that is uncorrelated with case characteristics or with the plaintiff's
or defendant's idiosyncratic component of the probability of liability (9 and Od).The
observed win rate at trial is the expectation of ittconditionalon both case being filed and
the case being decided at trial. This is
=E[ir + OE(V)>0,(O —Od)D — (C+ Cd) >0]
=E[irE(V) > 0,(O —Od)D
—(C+ Cd) >0] (19)
where the first conditioning event is that the claim is filed as a lawsuit and the second
conditioning event is that the case was decided at trial. The second equality follows from
the fact that O has zero mean and is uncorrelated with case characteristics so that its
conditional expectation is also zero. The probability of a trial (the second conditioning
event) does not depend directly on the common information on the probability of liability
(ii-).Thus,the effect of selection on case characteristics is due to the plaintiff's decision
regarding whether to file a lawsuit. Case characteristics will affect the plaintiff win rate to
the extent that they affect the distribution of itthroughthe selection process.
13Higher values of plaintiff's costs imply that the minimum threshold value of itatwhich
potential plaintiffs decide to file lawsuits will increase, ceteris paribus. Thus, plaintiff
win rates at trial will be higher where plaintiff's costs are higher. Higher stakes and
higher defendant's costs imply the opposite. The minimum threshold value of itatwhich
potential plaintiffs decide to file lawsuits will decrease where the stakes or defendant costs
are higher, ceteris paribus. Thus, plaintiff win rates at trial will be lower where the stakes
or defendant's costs are higher. These predictions are summarized in the right hand panel
of table 1.
One potential complication is that the expected outcome of the case (irD)mayaffect
the costs of litigation. It may be optimal for the parties to spend more to pursue or defend
high-expected outcome cases. Thus, there is a direct effect of the expected outcome on the
case-selection decision, and there is an indirect effect through the costs. The indirect effect
through the defendant's costs works in the same direction as the direct effect of the stakes.
Higher expected outcomes and higher defendant costs yield a higher E(V)whichimplies
that potential plaintiffs will be more likely to file suit. But the indirect effect through
the plaintiff's costs works in the opposite direction. Higher plaintiff's costs reduce the
likelihood that the potential plaintiff will decide to file a suit. We assume that the direct
effect dominates so that an increase in the expected stakes will never raise plaintiff's costs
so much that the plaintiff becomes less likely to file suit.
Our analysis has implications for how case outcomes (trial rates and plaintiff win rates)
with the federal government as a party differ from case outcomes with two private parties.
These implications are derived from institutional and legal differences between cases with
the two types of parties with regard to the probability of liability (it),thestakes of the
case (D), and the litigation costs (C and Cd).
4. The Government as Defendant: Tort Claims
Consider a private plaintiff who is deciding whether or not to file suit in a particular
case. This decision will be based on the value of E(V)asdescribed in equations 1 and
2. The difference between cases where the potential defendant is the government and
where the potential defendant is a private party depends on how tort litigation with the
14government and private parties differ with regard to litigation costs (Cd and C)andthe
components of expected damages (7r and D).
Withregard to defendants' costs, it is plausible that the government's defense costs
are, on average, lower than those of private defendants in similar cases. The federal
government, unlike many private defendants, has a standing corps of lawyers available
to defend it in litigation. It need not retain counsel on an hourly or contingent basis to
defend the action. Less tangible aspects of costs also point to the government having lower
mean costs than private defendants. The government never faces bet-the-company cases
which might reduce a private firm's taste for litigation. And the government, which need
not trade in the private market, may have less concern about reputation than a private
defendant. We thus believe that the government, on average (though not in every case),
has lower litigation costs than do private defendants. Based on our selection model, as
summarized in table 1, this suggests that the trial rate will be higher and plaintiff win
rates will be higher in tort cases where the government is defendant relative to cases with
a private party as defendant.
But the difference in costs is not the only contrast between cases with a private defen-
dant and cases with the government as defendant. Earlier, we noted differences between
the law governing FTCA cases against the United States and private diversity-based tort
actions that can affect the components of expected damages. We address five differences in
tort litigation: 1) a jurisdictional amount limitation, 2) punitive damages, 3) the availabil-
ity of jury trial, 4) the discretionary function exception under the FTCA, and 5) exhaustion
of remedies.
The jurisdictional amount limitation for diversity cases means that federal courts see
a select group of state-law based personal injury tort cases. Only those cases with more
than $50,000 ($10,000 prior to 1988) in controversy are eligible for federal litigation, thus
limiting federal courts to big diversity cases. One thus expects federal court diversity cases
to differ from the mass of tort cases in the amount at stake." The low stakes cases are not
This turns out to be the case, with federal court diversity tort cases having much higher mean and
median recoveries than tort cases adjudicated in state court, where there is no minimum-damage threshold.
(Eisenberg et al., 1996:439). Tabulation of amounts awarded to winning plaintiffs in federal court also
show somewhat higher mean and median awards in diversity cases relative to FTCA cases.
15similarly trimmed in FTCA actions. Since there is no jurisdictional amount limitation in
FTCA cases, a group of low stakes cases may be filed against the United States in federal
court that cannot be filed against private parties accused of the same behavior. The
inability to recover punitive damages further lowers the stakes in FTCA cases compared
with diversity cases.12
It is not clear how the unavailability of jury trials against the United states affects the
composition of cases filed relative to cases brought against private parties. It may be that
the possibility of a jury trial leads plaintiffs to file cases with low probability of winning (ir)
but possibly high awards (D)inthose cases they do win (e.g., Clermont and Eisenberg,
1992:1140-43; Salop and White:1018-19). The effect of this on expected returns (irD)is
ambiguous.
Neither is it clear how the discretionary function defense available to the United States
under the FTCA will affect the composition of cases. This defense embodies the principal
that "it is not a tort to govern" and thus gives the government leeway to make the decisions
necessary to govern without being subjected to tort liability when discretionarydecisions
do not work out.13 On the one hand, this added defense available to the government may
reduce the probability of a plaintiff win against the government compared to the probability
of a plaintiff win against a private party. On the other hand, since private parties do not
face the range of decisions that governments face, the discretionary function exception may
narrow the differences in the subject matters of private and FTCA actions.14
Finally the requirement that plaintiffs in actions against the government exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before filing suit serves to narrow the difference between cases against
the government under the FTCA and diversity cases against private parties. The exhaus-
12 Available data suggest, however, that punitive damages are very rarely awarded in personal injury
tort litigation so the jurisdictional amount limitation is probably the dominant effect on stakes (Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 1995:6; Daniels and Martin, 1995; Moller, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1997:633-637).
13 E.g, Bergh v. Washington, 585 P.2d 805, 812 (Wash. App. 1978) (concurring opinion).
14 The discretionary function exception creates a rather fine line. Compare Berkovitz v. United States,
486 U.S. 531, 1988 (discretionary function exception did not protect United States in action based on
allegedly wrongful licensing and release of vaccine) with United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 1991
(discretionary function exception may protect operational or management level decisions by regulatory
bodies that became involved in the day-to-day operation of a savings and loan association).
16tion of remedies requirement likely increases the costs of plaintiffs in government-defendant
cases compared with the costs of plaintiffs in private-defendant cases.
Overall, our analysis of how the legal differences between suits filed against the gov-
ernment under the FTCA and diversity cases with private defendants concludes that cases
filed against the government have, on average, lower defendant costs, lower stakes, and
higher plaintiff's costs. Using the selection, model, summarized in table 1, the lower stakes
and higher plaintiff's costs have ambiguous effects on the trial rate, but the lower defendant
costs imply a higher trial rate in cases against the government. There is no such ambiguity
regard to the plaintiff win rate at trial. The selection model predicts that the lower stakes,
higher plaintiff's costs, and lower defendant costs will result in higher plaintiff win rates
at trial where the government is defendant. These predictions are summarized in the first
row of table 2.
5. The Government as Party in .Job Discrimination Cases
The Government as Defendant
As in tort cases, we assume that the government's defense costs in job discrimination
cases are, on average, lower than private defendants' costs. And, as before, this assumption
forecasts higher trial rates in cases involving the U.S. as defendant and higher plaintiff win
rates. It is again necessary to account for differences in legal rules applicable to government
and private defendants.
Government and private defendants operate under somewhat different rules in job dis-
crimination cases, though the differences are not as great as in tort cases. Perhaps the most
important difference is the lack of an alternative statutory remedy against the United States
for job discrimination. The alternative remedy against private parties for job discrimina-
tion, available under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, gave black plaintiffs a chance for compensatory
and punitive damages against private defendants.'5 Since such damages are not available
15After1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made such damages available to female plaintiffs suing private
parties.
17against the United States, the stakes (D) are lower in job discrimination cases with the
government as defendant relative to private-defendant cases.trial rates.
Overall, we conclude from our analysis of how the legal differences between job dis-
crimination suits filed against the government differ from job discrimination suits filed
against private defendants that cases filed against the government have, on average, lower
defendant costs and lower stakes. Using the selection, model, summarized in table 1, the
lower stakes have ambiguous effects on the trial rate, but the lower defendant costs imply
a higher trial rate in cases against the government. The model has a clear prediction
with regard to the plaintiff win rate at trial. The selection model predicts that the lower
stakes and lower defendant costs will result in higher plaintiff win rates at trial where the
government is defendant. These predictions are summarized in the second row of table 2.
The Government As Plaintiff
Job discrimination is the only subject matter area for which we have data, for which
both the government and private parties frequently appear as plaintiffs, and for which the
law applicable to the government is substantially similar to the law applicable to private
parties.'6 But there are differences.
Job discrimination cases in which the government appears as plaintiff have gone through
an elaborate screening process. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
chooses, from among the thousands of complaints filed with it, which complaints to convert
to lawsuits brought in its own name. It is not clear to us that the government-as-plaintiff
has lower mean financial costs than private job discrimination plaintiffs, but the decision
to file suit likely differs between the EEOC and private plaintiffs. Presumably, the EEOC
screens cases carefully and makes choices regarding litigation based on the economic merits
of the case. But the class of individuals who bring job discrimination cases is dominated
by people who have lost their jobs (Donohue and Siegelman, 1991:984). These private
plaintiffs in job discrimination cases are, on average, those job-losers with the lowest costs
16 The other class of cases in which we study the government-as-defendant, personal injury tortcases,
does not contain cases in which the government appears as plaintiff. The government does not suffer
personal injuries in the way that private individuals do and so does not appear as a plaintiff in personal
injury tort actions.
18of litigation, where costs of litigation are defined broadly to include pecuniary as well as
(perhaps negative) nonpecuniary costs.
On this basis, a crude characterization of the government's case selection process in job
discrimination cases is that the government selects "high quality" cases, that is, cases with
a relatively high probability of plaintiff victory (high it). In contrast, the case selection
process of private plaintiffs in job discrimination cases is more likely to depend strongly on
relatively low litigation costs (low Cr),oftennonpecuniary, that come from the experience
of a job loss.17
The selection model, summarized in table 1, implies that the higher value of it in
discrimination cases brought by the government will result in a lower trial rate. The
higher effective costs to the government as plaintiff has a negative direct effect on the trial
rate that is offset to some extent by a positive selection effect. The higher values of it and
of C,bothimply unambiguously higher plaintiff win rates at trial. These predictions are
summarized in the last row of table 2.
6. The Data
The data used here were gathered by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.'8 When any civil case terminates in federal district court, the court clerk trans-
mits a form to the Administrative Office containing information about the case. The
form includes data regarding the subject matter of the case, removal status, the amount
demanded, the dates of filing and termination, the procedural progress of the case at ter-
mination, the method of disposition and, when a judgment was entered, who prevailed
and any amount awarded in damages. The form distinguishes among many subject matter
categories, including branches of contract, tort, and other areas of law. The form distin-
guishes among several areas of personal injury tort law. It also contains a category labeled
job discrimination that includes Title VII cases, section 1981 cases, and cases from other
branches of antidiscrimination employment law.
17 In other areas of law, plaintiffs in employment cases also fare unusually poorly (Hillman, 1998:583,
591-93).
18 For a fuller description of the database, see Clermont and Eisenberg, 1992:1133-34.
19For present purposes, a key aspect of the data is that it indicates the jurisdictional basis
for each case's presence in federal court. Four bases of federal jurisdiction are relevant: (1)
the United States is a plaintiff, (2) the United States is a defendant, (3) the case involves
a federal question, one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
(4) the case arises under state law but involves parties who are citizens of different states,
the so-called diversity jurisdiction.
By using the subject matter of the cases and the basis for jurisdiction we can identify
personal injury tort cases against the United States and personal injury tort cases based
on diversity jurisdiction. Further, we can distinguish job discrimination cases brought by
and against the United States from job discrimination cases brought by and against other
parties.19
We create two samples from these data. Our first sample contains all personal injury
cases filed in federal court between July 1, 1979 and September 30, 1997 because of diversity
jurisdiction or with the government as defendant. This sample contains 418,853 cases,
comprised of 368,567 diversity cases and 50,836 cases with government as defendant. Our
second sample contains all job discrimination cases filed in federal court over the same
period. This sample contains 205,368 cases, comprised of 182,327 cases with involving
only private parties, 15,680 cases with the government as defendant, and 7,361 cases with
the federal government as plaintiff.
Since our data end with the close of the 1997 federal government fiscal year, we have no
data on case progress after September 30, 1997. Thus, any cases not resolved by that date
are censored in the sense that their outcomes are not observed. Of the 418,953 personal
injury cases filed between July 1979 and September 1997, 365,577 were resolved and 53,376
were not resolved in time for the resolution to be recorded in our data. Of the 205,368 job
discrimination cases filed between July 1979 and September 1997, 177,957 were resolved
19 A portion, presumably small, of the job discrimination cases treated here as private-defendant cases
are in fact filed against state governments and we have no way to separate those cases out. 42 U.S.C. sec.
2000e(a).
The tort cases we consider do not include actions against states. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits
state-law based tort actions from being brought against states in federal court. See Welch v. State Dep 't
of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 1987 (Jones Act); Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 1982 (admiralty cases).
20and 27,411 were not resolved in time for the resolution to be recorded in our data. This
censoring is an important statistical problem in the analysis of trial rates and outcomes
because cases that proceed to trial are likely to take substantially longer to resolve than
cases that are dropped or settled without a trial verdict. Thus, tried cases will be censored
disproportionately.
Table 3 shows the number of cases in our sample filed in each calendar year by category
of case.20 Table 3 also shows the fraction of cases pending as of September 30, 1997 by
year of filing. Overall, about 13 percent of cases in our samples are censored, and it is
clear that cases filed more recently are much more likely to be censored.
That this censoring is an important problem is apparent from the tabulations of the
fraction of cases tried by year of filing contained in table 3. This fraction is computed
as the fraction of resolved cases where there was a trial verdict. The trial rate computed
this way falls dramatically with the year of filing. It is doubtful that this represents a real
decline in trial rates. It is almost surely an artifact of the decline in time until the censoring
date with year of filing and the concomitant lack of time for cases that will ultimately be
tried to reach a trial verdict.
A straightforward approach to the censoring problem is to use oniy cases filed long
enough before 1997 so that the censoring problem is minimal.2' However, the overall
trial rate is less than six percent for personal injury cases and less than nine percent for
job discrimination cases (though this is a somewhat downward biased estimate given the
censoring). Even a small amount of censoring is likely to seriously affect estimates of
the trial rate. Thus, the fact that 5.5 percent of personal injury cases filed in 1992 are
unresolved make even this year unsuitable for the analysis of trial rates. The fraction
20 The number of cases filed in 1979 is about half of the number in the immediately succeeding years
because we have no data on cases filed prior to July 1, 1979. Similarly, the number of cases filed in 1997 is
about 3/4 the number of cases filed in the immediately preceding years because we have no data on cases
filed after September 30, 1997.
21 In our earlier work, we developed a number of parametric statistical models that accounted for the
censoring (Eisenberg and Farber: 5103-S106). These models relied on strong parametric assumptions, but
we were restricted to using data on cases filed from 1986-1994 and closed by September 30, 1994. Given
the relatively smaller sample size, it was not feasible to drop cases filed in the latter part of the sample
period. The longer time period used here makes it feasible to drop cases filed in the later years while
preserving adequate sample sizes.
21of personal injury cases that are unresolved (the censoring rate) falls to 0.15 percent for
cases filed in 1991. Thus, we limit our analysis of personal injury cases to cases filed in
1979-1991 that were resolved by September 30, 1997 in order to be reasonably sure that
censoring is not be a significant problem.22 The censoring rate falls off more gradually for
job discrimination cases. The censoring rate is 1.66 percent for job discrimination cases
filed in 1993, 0.72 percent for cases filed in 1992, and 0.33 percent for cases filed in 1991.
We also limit our analysis of job discrimination cases to cases filed 1979-1991 that were
resolved by September 30, 1997.23
While measuring the trial rate is straightforward, determining or even defining who
wins at trial is not. The data are fairly limited on this question, and we define a party as
winning if a judgment was entered for that party. The central problem with this measure
is that just because a judgment was entered for a particular party does not mean that
the party, in fact, "won". For example, a plaintiff who files suit expecting a substantial
damage award may settle for or receive at trial a very small damage award. This case
would be recorded as a judgment for the plaintiff, and we call this a plaintiff win. But the
plaintiff might perceive this as a loss. It is also the case that information on the identity of
the party for whom judgment was entered is missing in 7.4 percent of the cases with trial
outcomes.24
The data record the broad legal category of each case. Table 4 lists these categories
and shows 1) the number of cases in each category in our sample, 2) the rate at which
cases in each category are resolved at trial, and 3) the rate at which cases ending in trial
judgments are won by plaintiffs. By far the largest categories of personal injury cases are
"motor vehicle" and "other PT". Additionally, "asbestos" and "PT product liability" are
large case categories. There is significant variation in the level of government involvement
22 Of the 246,048 personal injury cases filed between 1979 and 1991, only 337 (0.14 percent) were censored
as of September 30, 1997.
23 Of the 102,358 job discrimination cases filed between 1979 and 1991, only 87 (0.08 percent) were
censored as of September 30, 1997.
24 Aportion (about 30 percent) of the cases we code as missing had a judgment entered for both parties.
The missing data problem is much more severe in cases resolved without a trial verdict, where 83 percent
are missing information on the identity of the party for whom a judgment was entered. Presumably, these
are largely cases that are dropped or settled without having a formal judgment entered in court.
22across legal categories, ranging from a low of 0.3 percent of asbestos cases having the
federal government as defendant to a high of 40.6 percent of medical PT cases having
the federal government as defendant. There is also a substantial difference in trial rates
across categories with the highest trial rates in "medical P1" and the lowest trial rates
in "asbestos". Plaintiff win rates at trial vary substantially across personal injury case
categories, from a low of 28.7 percent in "P1 product liability" to a high of 68 percent
in "asbestos" cases. Plaintiff win rates in job discrimination cases are quite low at 25.5
percent.
7. Empirical Results
Trial Rates -Governmentas Defendant
Table 5 contains tabulations of trial rates by party identity and case category. As a
benchmark, the first column of the table contains the trial rate for each case category for
cases with private defendants. The second column contains the trial rates by case category
for cases with the government as defendant. The prediction of the case selection model,
summarized in tables 1 and 2, for both personal injury and job discrimination cases is that
trial rates will be higher in cases with the government as defendant, and the tabulations
are consistent with this prediction. The third column of the table contains the difference
in trial rates between cases with the government as defendant and cases with private
defendants. Overall, trial rates are 4.2 percentage points higher in personal injury cases
with the government as defendant (p < 0.0005) and 1.2 percentage points higher in job
discrimination cases with the government as defendant (p =0.001).Within the personal
injury cases, the trial rates are higher in cases with the government as defendant in all case
categories save one (assault, libel, slander), and the differences are statistically significant
at conventional levels in all but two categories (asbestos and PT product liability).25
25 The "assault, libel, slander" category is conceptually awkward because it lumps together quite different
torts. Furthermore, assault cases may well be qualitatively different as between government and private
defendants. Assaults involving government defendants have civil rights overtones that are lacking in assault
cases involving private defendants. However, we expect that most assault cases involving government
officials would appear in the Administrative Office Data's civil rights categories, not its tort categories.
23It is possible that the mix of personal injury cases differs for private and government
defendants. Trial rates are known to differ across categories of personal injury tort cases.
For example, medical malpractice cases have high trial rates compared to all other classes of
personal injury tort cases (Eisenberg et al., 1996). This is true for both state and federal
court cases. However, it is unlikely that the difference in trial rates for the aggregated
personal injury category is the result of a different mix of personal injury cases being
filed against government and private defendants because the trial rates in virtually every
category are higher for cases with the government as defendant.
Potentially more important is the possibility that the mix of cases and outcomes has
varied over time or varies systematically across district courts in ways make it appear that
the trial rate is higher in cases with the government as defendant. In order to investigate
these possibilities, we estimated linear probability models of the probability of a trial that
include fixed effects for case category (8 categories for personal injury, 1 category for job
discrimination), year of filing (13 categories), and federal court district (91 categories).
These results are contained in tables 6 and 7.
Based on the estimates in table 6, the raw 4.2 percentage point difference in trial rates
in personal injury cases is reduced by almost half (to 2.3 percentage points) controlling for
case category. Controlling for year of filing alone reduces the difference from 4.2 points to
3.4 points, but controlling for the district court actually slightly increases the difference
from 4.2 points to 4.6 points. Overall, controlling for case category, filing year, and district
court reduces the raw difference from 4.2 points to 2.8 points. This difference remains
strongly statistically significant and is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Similar estimates for job discrimination cases are contained in table 7. The raw dif-
ference of 1.2 percentage points is not affected significantly by the inclusion of the control
variables. Controlling for filing year and district court increases the point estimate of the
raw difference from 1.2 points to 1.6 points. Once again, this difference remains strongly
statistically significant and is consistent with the prediction of our model.
24Trial Rates -Governmentas Plaintiff
Our analysis of the government as plaintiff focuses only on job discrimination cases.
The entry in the fourth column of table 5 contains the trial rate for job discrimination
cases with the government as plaintiff. The prediction of the case selection model for
job discrimination cases is that trial rates will be lower in cases with the government
as plaintiff, and the tabulations are consistent with this prediction. The fifth column
of the table contains the difference in trial rates between cases with the government as
plaintiff and cases with private plaintiffs. Trial rates are 4.5 percentage points lower in job
discrimination cases with the government as plaintiff (p <0.0005).
Once again, in order to consider the role of filing year and federal court district, we
estimated linear probability models of the probability of a trial verdict that include fixed
effects in these dimensions. These estimates are contained in table 8. The raw differ-
ence of -4.5 percentage points is reduced slightly by the inclusion of the control variables.
Controlling for filing year alone reduces the magnitude of the point estimate of the raw
difference from -4.5 points to -3.8 points. Controlling for court district alone has no ef-
fect on the point estimate of the raw difference, but controlling for both filing year and
court district reduces the point estimate from -4.5 to -3.6 points. This difference remains
strongly statistically significant and is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Plaintiff Win Rates -Governmentas Defendant
Table 9 contains tabulations of plaintiff win rates at trial by party identity and case
category. As a benchmark, the first column of the table contains the plaintiff win rate
for each case category for cases with private defendants. The second column contains the
win rate by case category for cases with the government as defendant. The prediction of
the case selection model, summarized in tables 1 and 2, for both personal injury and job
discrimination cases is that plaintiff win rates will be higher in cases with the government
as defendant. The third column of the table contains the difference in plaintiff win rates
between cases with the government as defendant and cases with private defendants. The
tabulations provide mixed evidence on this prediction. Overall, plaintiff win rates are 2.5
percentage points higher in personal injury cases with the government as defendant (p <
250.0005) but 10.5 percentage points lower in job discrimination cases with the government
as defendant (p < 0.0005). Within the personal injury cases, the evidence is also mixed.
Of the eight case categories, the point estimate of the difference is positive, as expected, in
five and negative in three. Three of the five positive estimates are significantly positive at
conventional levels and two of the three negative estimates are significantly different from
zero at conventional levels.26
Estimates of linear probability models of plaintiff win rates at trial that control for
case category, filing year, and federal court district are contained in tables 10 and 11 for
personal injury and job discrimination cases respectively. Based on the estimates in table
10, the raw 2.5 percentage point difference in trial rates in personal injury cases increases to
3.6 percentage points controlling for case category. Controlling for year of filing alone does
not change the raw difference substantially, but controlling for the district court moves
the point estimate of the difference to near zero and insignificance. Overall, controlling for
case category, filing year, and district court reduces the raw difference from 2.5 points to
1.8 points. This difference is marginally statistically significantly positive (p =0.051)and
is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Similar estimates for job discrimination cases, where the raw difference of -10.5 per-
centage points is not consistent with the predictions of the model, are contained in table
11. The raw difference is not affected significantly by the inclusion of the control variables.
Controlling for filing year and district court increases the point estimate of the raw dif-
ference from -10.5 points to -11.4 points, and the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination
cases remains inconsistent with the selection model.
Plaintiff Win Rates -Governmentas Plaintiff
As before, our analysis of the government as plaintiff focuses oniy on job discrimination
cases. The entry in the fourth column of table 9 contains the plaintiff win rate for job
discrimination cases with the government as plaintiff. The prediction of the case selection
model for job discrimination cases is that plaintiff win rates will be higher in cases with the
26 One of the three contrary results is "assault, libel, slander", which, as we noted earlier, is a conceptually
awkward category. Supra note 26.
26government as plaintiff, and the tabulations are consistent with this prediction.The fifth
column of the table contains the difference in win rates between cases with the government
as plaintiff and cases with private plaintiffs. Plaintiff win rates are 16.8 percentage points
higher in job discrimination cases with the government as plaintiff (p < 0.0005).
Once again, in order to consider the role of filing year and federal court district, we
estimated linear probability models of the probability of a plaintiff win at trial. These
estimates are contained in table 12. The raw difference in the plaintiff win rate of 16.8
percentage points is roughly unaffected by the inclusion of the controlvariables. Control-
ling for both filing year and court district reduces the point estimate of the differencein
plaintiff win rates from 16.8 to 15.8 points. This difference remains strongly statistically
significant and is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Further Discussion of Results
Our model's predictions about trial rates are strongly confirmed, but the model's ability
to account for trial win rates is more limited. Why might this be?
One potential answer is that there are omitted factors affecting the decision to file
claims against the government. Specifically, plaintiffs may overestimate their chances of
success against the government as compared to their estimates of the chancesof success
against private parties. Judges and juries may be more protective of the government
than plaintiffs believe they will be (Eisenberg, 1989:1599-1600). Or information about
government behavior may be less readily observable and discoverablethan information
about private party behavior.27
The model is especially vulnerable in its prediction that government defendants are
more likely to lose job discrimination trials than are private defendants.In this area, it
may be that plaintiffs' perceptions about levels of governmentdiscrimination are out of
line with reality. If plaintiffs' perceptions about government discriminatory behavior are
27 In one perspective, even partial vindication of the model's prediction that the government will fare
relatively poorly at trial is powerful evidence of the need for a case selection model. Conventional wisdom
is that one should observe higher than normal success rates for powerful government litigants such as the
United States (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988b:774-76).
27skewed, we should observe higher rates of job discrimination lawsuits against the U.S. per
worker than we observe against private employers. This is in fact the case.
For example, in 1990, the federal government employed 3.26 million nonfarm workers
(U.S. Census Bureau, 1998:Table A-51). The civilian labor force in that year consisted of
approximately 115.5 million non-U.S. government workers (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998:Ta-
ble A-19). About 15 percent of workers are not covered by Title VII due to its limitation
to large employers (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a:602).28 This leaves about 98 million
non-U.S. government workers covered by Title VII, roughly 30 times the number of U.S.
government workers. Yet federal job discrimination lawsuits against non-U.S. defendants
run only roughly eight to nine times the number of job discrimination lawsuits against
the U.S. Job discrimination lawsuits thus are filed at a much higher rate against the U.S.
than against private parties. Unless the U.S. is massively more discriminatory than private
parties, this high claiming rate could be the source of the unexpectedly low trial win rate
against the U.S.29 A relatively weak class of cases may be being filed against the U.S.
In comparison, the rate of personal injury tort claiming against the U.S. is much lower.
In federal court alone, diversity actions filed against private parties are about nine to ten
times the number of FTCA actions against the U.S. And the diversity actions comprise
a relatively small fraction of personal injury tort action. Most of it occurs in state court
(Eisenberg et al., 1996). Thus, claiming rates against the U.S. in the personal injury tort
area probably more accurately reflect the level of U.S. government misbehavior than do
claiming rates against the U.S. in the job discrimination area. The U.S. appears to act as
a magnet for job discrimination plaintiffs in a way that it does not for tort victims. This
may explain why our model predicts relative win rates better in the personal injury tort
28 Some of these workers could bring an action under sec. 1981.
29 In fact, the federalgovernment appears to be less discriminatory in employment on the basis of race
and sex. For example, we find using the February 1995 and February 1997 CPSs, that, after controlling
for education and age, the gap in wages between men and women and between whites and nonwhites
is significantly smaller in the Federal government than in the private sector. We find additionally that
the fraction of nonwhites employed by the federal government is twice as high as the fraction of whites
employed by the federal government, while there is no difference for females. These differences are probably
due to the existence of the Civil Service System, which attempts to administer employment decisions in
the federal government on race and sex neutral grounds. For an early analysis with similar findings, see
Smith (1977).
28area than in job discrimination cases.30
8. Summary and Conclusion
Overall, we found substantial support for the predictions of the case selection model,
summarized in table 2, for differences in case outcomes between the government and pri-
vate litigants. The model generates six predictions for trial rates and plaintiff win rates
for the categories of cases and roles for the government we study. Five of the six predic-
tions are supported by the data. The only deviation is that the plaintiff win rate in job
discrimination cases with the government as defendant is lower than the plaintiff win rate
in job discrimination cases with private defendants while the model predicts the opposite
relationship. This anomaly may be attributable to extraordinarily high job discrimination
claiming rates against the U.S.
This study's results are important in showing the power of modeling the case selection
process carefully when evaluating case outcomes. The government goes to trial at a higher
rate than private parties when it is defendant and at a lower rate than private parties when
it is plaintiff. The government as defendant appears to lose more often than private de-
fendants and the government as plaintiff appears to win more often than private plaintiffs.
These findings are easily understood in the context of the case selection model, and they
cannot be easily explained by theories that rely on such factors as differential quality of
counsel.31
Other factors we do not consider here undoubtedly also influence trial rates and trial
win rates.32 For example, we have no direct measures of quality of counsel. We do not deny
that alternative explanations may exist for the patterns we predict and observe. However,
30 In the context of our model, the higher claiming rate against the government in job discrimination
cases could be due either to lower plaintiff costs (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) or to relative optimism on
the part of plaintiffs against the government regarding the likelihood of a trial victory (high 6,).Ineither
case, our selection model predicts not only lower plaintiff win rates against the government but also the
higher trial rates we predict and find for job discrimination cases with government defendants.
31 The resultsare also consistent in their support for the case selection model with the results of our
earlier work, where we used the distinction between corporations and individuals as parties in diversity
cases (Eisenberg and Farber).
32 For asurvey and synthesis, see Kessler et al.
29our model's predictions about both trial rates and success rates in litigation as they relate to
the identity of both plaintiffs and defendants helps to separate its implications from factors
emphasized in other models, which often have implications for only a single outcome.33
A final point is that testing the case selection model is hampered by the likelihood that
only a tiny fraction of potential claims are filed as lawsuits. Essentially, we are looking for
the effects of the case selection model when only the "successes" are observed. That the
model does as well as it does with such "partial observability" is encouraging in our view,
but more direct evidence could come from settings where both cases selected and those
not selected can be observed.
See Eisenberg and Farber for mention of alternative explanations.
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32TABLE 1
Summary of Predictions of Selection Model
for Trial Rates and Plaintiff Win Rates at Trial
by Case Characteristic
Param.Trial Rate Trial Rate Trial RateWin Rate Win Rate Win Rate
Direct Effect Selection EffectOverallDirect EffectSelection EffectOverall
0 - + + +
D + - U
cp + 0 + +
Cd - - U -
TABLE2
Summary of Predictions of SelectionModel
forTrial Rates and Plaintiff Win Ratesat Trial
Differences between Governement and Private Parties
Type of Case Role of GovTrial RatePlaintiff Win Rate
Personal Injury DefendantGov > Priv Gov> Priv
Job Discrimination DefendantGov>Priv Gov>Priv
Job DiscriminationPlaintiff Gov <Priv Coy > Priv
33TABLE 3
Case Distribution andResolutionby Year of Filing
Note:Fraction Pending is computed as the fraction of Number of Cases Filed that are not resolved
by September 30, 1997 Fraction Tried is computed as the fraction of cases resolved by September






































































Case Distribution and Outcomes by Case Category










5017 0.286 -—— 0.0875 0.473
5865 0.141 ——- 0.0663 0.504
5063 0.293 ——— 0.0816 0.558
65236 0.119 ——- 0.0678 0.635
63323 0.201 —-- 0.0810 0.464
15378 0.406 ——— 0.1171 0.367
45677 0.003 ——— 0.0114 0.680
40162 0.079 -—— 0.0730 0.287
Total Personal Injury 245721 0.140 --- 0.0653 0.477
Job Discrimination 102271 0.091 0.049 0.0799 0.255
Note: The number of cases consists of all lawsuits in the indicated categories filed in Federal Courts
between July 1979 and September 1991 and resolved (dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by
September 30, 1997. The trial rate is the fraction of cases that were tried to a verdict by September
30, 1997. The Plaintiff win rate is computed as the ratio of the number of cases where a judgement
was entered for the plaintiff after a trial verdict divided by the number of cases where a judgement
was entered for one party or the other after a trial verdict.
35TABLE 5
Trial Rates by Party Identity and Case Category
Case Category
Personal Injury





























































Job Discrimination 0.116 .128 0.012 0.071-0.045
(0.001) (0.003)(0.004) (0.005)(0.005)
Note:The sample consists of all lawsuits in the indicated categories filed in Federal Courts between
July 1979 and September 1991 and resolved (dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by September
30, 1997. The trial rate is the fraction of cases that were tried to a verdict by September 30, 1997.
The Gov's are the differences in trial rates between cases with the indicated government parties
and the trial rate in cases with private parties. There are no personal injury cases with government
as plaintiff. Sample sizes are contained in table 2. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
36TABLE 6
Effect of Defendant Identity on Trial Rates
Linear Probability Model Estimates
Personal Injury Cases
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LGov 0.042 0.023 0.034 0.046 0.028
(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)
Case Category No Yes No No Yes
YearofFiling No No Yes No Yes
DistrictCourt No No No Yes Yes
Note: zGov is the coefficienton a dummy variable for government defendant in a linear probability
model of the probability of a trial verdict on the indicated control variables. As such, it representsthe
regression-adjusteddifference in trial rates between cases with the government as defendant and the
trial rate in cases with private defendants. The sample consists of 245,721 personal injury lawsuits
filed in Federal Courts between July 1979 and September 1991 and resolved (dropped, settled, or
tried to a verdict) by September 30, 1997. The trial rate is the fraction of cases that were tried to
a verdict by September 30, 1997. There are 9 case categories, 13 filing years, and 91 district courts.
The numbers in parentheses are robust Huber-White standard errors.
TABLE 7
Effect of Defendant Identity on Trial Rates
Linear Probability Model Estimates
Job Discrimination Cases
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
LGov 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.016
(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)
Year of Filing No Yes No Yes
District Court No No Yes Yes
Note: LGov is thecoefficient on a dummy variable for government defendant in a linear probability
modelof theprobability of a trial verdict on the indicated control variables. As such, it representsthe
regression-adjusteddifference in trial rates between cases with the government as defendant and the
trial rate in cases with private defendants. The sample consists of 97,265 job discrimination lawsuits
filed in Federal Courts by private plaintiffs between July 1979 and September 1991 and resolved
(dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by September 30, 1997. The trial rate is the fraction of cases
that were tried to a verdict by September 30, 1997. There are 13 filing years and 91 district courts.
The numbers in parentheses are robust Huber-White standard errors.
37TABLE 8
Effect of Plaintiff Identity on Trial Rates
Linear Probability Model Estimates
Job Discrimination Cases
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
LGov —0.045 -0.038—0.044—0.036
(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)
Year of Filing No Yes No Yes
District Court No No Yes Yes
Note: Gov is the coefficient on a dummyvariable for government plaintiff in a linear probability
modelof the probability of a trial verdict on the indicated control variables. Assuch, it representsthe
regression-adjusteddifference in trial rates between cases with the government as plaintiff and the
trial rate in cases with private plaintiffs. The sample consists of 92,944 job discrimination lawsuits
filed in Federal Courts by private plaintiffs between July 1979 and September 1991 and resolved
(dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by September 30 1997. The trial rate is the fraction of cases
that were tried to a verdict by September 30, 1997. There are 13 filing years and 91 district courts.
The numbers in parentheses are robust Huber-White standard errors.
38TABLE 9
Plaintiff Win Rates at Trial by Party Identity and Case Category
Case Category Private Gov DefendantZGov Gov PlaintiffGov
Personal Injury _______________________________
Airplane 0.463 0.487 0.024
(0.032) (0.039) (0.050)
Assault, Libel, Slander 0.529 0.326—0.204
(0.027) (0.075) (0.078)
Marine 0.534 0.593 0.059
(0.033) (0.041)(0.053)
Motor Vehicle 0.627 0.678 0.051
(0.008) (0.019)(0.021)
Other P1 0.478 0.428-0.051
(0.008) (0.014)(0.016)
Medical P1 0.272 0.494 0.222
(0.016) (0.018)(0.024)
Asbestos 0.682 0.000 —0.682
(0.025) (0.489)(0.482)






Job Discrimination 0.260 .156—0.105 0.428 0.168
(0.005) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025)(0.025)
Note: The sample consists of all lawsuits in the indicated categories filed in Federal Courts between
July 1979 and September 1991 and resolved by a trial verdict by September 30, 1997. The Plaintiff
win rate is computed as the ratio of the number of cases where a judgement was entered for the
plaintiff after a trial verdict divided by the number of cases where a judgement was entered for one
party or the other after a trial verdict. The zGov's are the differences in plaintiff win rates between
cases with the indicated government parties and the plaintiff win rate in cases with private parties.
There are no personal injury cases with government as plaintiff. Summary Statistics are contained
in table 2. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
39TABLE 10
Effect of Defendant Identity on Plaintiff Win Rates
Linear Probability Model Estimates
Personal Injury Cases
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gov 0.025 0.036 0.027 0.006 0.018
(0.010)(0.010)(0.010)(0.011)(0.011)
CaseCategory No Yes No No Yes
Year of Filing No No Yes No Yes
District Court No No No Yes Yes
Note: AGov is thecoefficient on a dummy variable for government defendant in a linear probability
modelof the probability of a plaintiff win at trialon the indicated control variables. As such,
it representsthe regression-adjusted difference in win ratesbetween cases with the government as
defendant and the trial rate in cases with private defendants. The sample consists of 14,288 personal
injury lawsuits filed in Federal Courts between July 1979 and September 1991 and tried to a verdict
by September 30, 1997. There are 9 case categories, 13 filing years, and 91 district courts. The
numbers in parentheses are robust Huber-White standard errors.
TABLE 11
Effect of Defendant Identity on Plaintiff Win Rates
Linear Probability Model Estimates
Job Discrimination Cases
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov —0.105 —0.107 —0.110—0.114
(0.012)(0.012)(0.013)(0.013)
Year of .Filing No Yes No Yes
District Court No No Yes Yes
Note: AGov is the coefficienton a dummy variable for government defendant in a linear probability
modelof the probability of a plaintiff win at trial on the indicated control variables. As such, it
represents the regression-adjusted difference in plaintiff win rates between cases with the government
as defendant and the plaintiff win rate in cases with private defendants. The sample consists of
10,222 job discrimination lawsuits filed in Federal Courts by private plaintiffs between July 1979
and September 1991 and tried to a verdict by September 30, 1997. There are 13 filing years and 91
district courts. The numbers in parentheses are robust Huber-White standard errors.
40TABLE 12
Effectof Plaintiff Identity on Plaintiff Win Rates
Linear Probability Model Estimates
Job Discrimination Cases
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov 0.168 0.162 0.164 0.158
(0.028)(0.029)(0.028)(0.028)
YearofFiling No Yes No Yes
DistrictCourt No No Yes Yes
Note:iGov is the coefficient on a dummy variable for government plaintiff in a linear probability
model of the probability of a plaintiff win at trial on the indicated control variables. As such, it
represents the regression-adjusted difference in plaintiff win rates between cases with the government
as plaintiff and the plaintiff win rate in cases with private plaintiffs. The sample consists of 9,451 job
discrimination lawsuits filed in Federal Courts by private plaintiffs between July 1979 and September
1991 and tried to a verdict by September 30, 1997. There are 13 filing years and 91 district courts.
The numbers in parentheses are robust Huber-White standard errors.
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